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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
COCHRAN MILL ASSOCIATES, * 
* 
Plaintiff, * 
v. * Civil Action File No. 2003-CV -77895 
* 
JOHN A. STEPHENS alk/a • 
JACK STEPHENS, d/b/a * 
ADANAC PROPERTIES, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment in the above-styled case is before the Court 
for consideration. The Court has reviewed the file, including the briefs submitted by the parties, 
and heard the oral argument of counsel on March 3, 2006. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
In 1998, Defendant, a real estate agent, arranged for the sale of raw land located in south 
Fulton County to the J.R. Oviedo Profit Sharing Trust ("Oviedo"). Defendantrepresented 
Oviedo in the purchase as his real estate agent and received a commission in conjunction with the 
sale. Thereafter, Defendant solicited a number of individuals to form a partnership for the 
purpose of purchasing a portion of the Oviedo property. Sixteen people, including Defendant, 
agreed to invest in the new partnership, Cochran Mill Associates. The partnership was formed 
and purchased the propeliy on June 30, 1989. Defendant served as Managing Partner for 
Cochran Mill until March 25, 1999, when he was replaced. 
Plaintiff Cochran Mill Associates initially filed suit against Defendant on March 7, 2000, 
alleging two general categories of claims: (1) claims arising from the purchase of the land; and 
-. 
(2) claims that Defendant mismanaged Plaintiffs financial affairs. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges 
that it overpaid for the property and that Defendant failed to disclose certain material facts 
-~. 
regarding his role in and the details regarding the previous purchase of the propelty by Oviedo. 
Plaintiffs claims regarding the purchase of the land include breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and 
misrepresentation. Plaintiff asserted the following claims against Defendant regarding his 
management of Plaintiffs financial affairs: a demand for an accounting; breach of fiduciary duty; 
actions outside of partnership authority; conversion; and negligence. 
Plaintiff dismissed the initial complaint and thereafter filed the instant complaint on 
November 18,2003, as a renewal action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-2-6l(a). On Februmy 24, 
2005, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding RICO claims against Defendant with respect 
to his management of Plaintiffs financial affairs. Defendant filed the instant motion for 
summary judgment on August 3, 2005, arguing primarily that Plaintiffs claims are time-barred. 
The Court agrees that Plaintiffs claims arising from the purchase of the land at issue are 
o barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. The land sale occurred in 1989 and Plaintiff was 
or could have been aware of the details regarding the purchase in the early 1990s, yet the initial 
complaint was not filed until 2000. The statutes of limitation for fraud and breach of fiduciary 
duty are four and six years, respectively. O.C.G.A. §§9-3-31 and 9-3-24; Crosby v. Kendall, 247 
Ga. App. 843 (2001); Hartley v. Gago, 202 Ga. App. 770 (1992). 
Plaintiff concedes that the initial complaint was filed long after the statutes of limitation 
expired, but argues that the limitation statutes are tolled by Defendant's conduct. However, 
Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that Defendant's conduct deterred or debarred Plaintiff 
from bringing an action in a timely manner. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-36; Allen v. Columbus Bank & 
Trust Co., 244 Ga. App. 271 (2000). 
Accordingly, Defendant's motion~ummary judgment as to Plaintiffs claims arising 
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from the purchase of the land is hereby GRANTED. 
Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claims 
regarding his mismanagement of the partnership's affairs because they too are time-barred. 
Unfortunately, the precise dates of Defendant's actions that purportedly give rise to Plaintiffs 
claims regarding mismanagement are not clearly set forth in the pleadings in this case. 
As aforementioned, Plaintiff filed the initial complaint on March 7, 2000. The statutes of 
limitation for Plaintiffs negligence and conversion claims are four years. O.C.G.A, §§ 9-3-3 I 
and 9-3-32. 1 The statute oflimitation for Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim is six years. 
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24; Crosby, supra. Therefore, any negligence or conversion claims based upon 
Defendant's actions that occurred after March 7, 1996, are not time-barred. Any breach of 
fiduciary duty claim based upon Defendant's actions that occurred after March 7, 1994, is not 
\=:) time-barred.2 
Moreover, the Court finds that there are questions of fact that preclude summary 
judgment regarding these claims. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to 
Plaintiffs negligence and conversion claims based upon Defendant's actions that occurred on or 
prior to March 7, 1996, is GRANTED; Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to 
Plaintiffs negligence and conversion claims based upon Defendant's actions that occurred after 
March 7, 1996, is DENIED. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs breach 
of fiduciary duty claims regarding mismanagement based upon Defendant's actions that occurred 
I The statute of limitations for negligent injuries to the person is two years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3·33. The statute of 
limitations for negligent injuries to personalty is four years. § 9-3·31. 
2 Again, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant deterred Plaintiff from filing suit so as to toll the 
applicable statutes of limitation. 
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o on or prior to March 7, 1994, is hereby GRANTED; Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
as to Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims based upon Defendant's actions that occurred 
atler March 7, 1994, is hereby DENIED. 
Plainti ff also asserts a demand for an accounting. Defendant contends that laches 
precludes the claim because Plaintiff delayed seeking an accounting until more than ten years 
after partners began questioning Defendant's management of the pminership. The COllli is not 
persuaded by Defendant's argument. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs 
claim for an accounting is hereby DENIED. 
Although Plaintiff filed its initial complaint on March 7, 2000, it did not assert its RICO 
claims until it filed an amended complaint on February 24,2005. The statute of limitation for a 
RICO claim is five years. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-8. The five-year statute oflimitation commences 
C) when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that he has been injured. 
C) 
Southern Intermodal Logistics, Inc. v. OJ. Powers Co., Inc., 251 Ga. App. 865 (1991). The 
statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the injury caused by the alleged wrongful 
conduct, not by the wrongful conduct itself. Id. 
Again, Plaintiffs amended complaint regarding its RICO claims contains no reference to 
the dates upon which Defendant's actions purportedly occurred, making a statute oflimitations 
analysis particularly difficult. There is evidence, however, that some of Plaintiffs partners began 
to question Defendant about partnership checks that he had written to himself "by no later than 
1993." (Defendant's reply brief in support of summary judgment, p. 14).3 Therefore, Plaintiff 
should have asserted its RICO claims no later than 1998. So, even if the Court were to find that 
Plaintiffs RICO claims relate back to the filing of the original complaint on March 7, 2000, they 
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are still time-barred. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's 
RICO claims is hereby GRANTED. 
Discovery/Pretrial Conference 
Having conferred with counsel, the Court orders that the following deadlines shall apply: 
Defendant shall depose Plaintiff's expert some time during the week of April 3, 2006; the 
deposition should be concluded no later than April 7, 2006. Plaintiff shall depose Defendant's 
expert some time during the week of April 24, 2006; the deposition should be concluded no later 
than April 28, 2006. 
The parties shall submit a proposed consolidated Pretrial Order to the Court on or before 
May 12,2006. The lawyers shall appear before the Court on May 17,2006 at 10:00 a.m. in 
Courtroom 8J for a pretrial conference. 
-#t 
SO ORDERED this ':8' day of March, 2006. 
Copies to: 
Gus H. Small, Esq. 
Kevin T. O'Sullivan, Esq. 
Cohen Pollock Merlin Axelrod & Small, P.C. 
3350 Riverwood Parkway 
Suite 1600 
Atlanta, Georgia 30339 
David W. Davenport, Esq. 
Keith A. Pittman, Esq. 
Lamar, Archer & Com'in LLP 
50 Hurt Plaza, Suite 900 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
3 Plaintiff alleges that conversion and theft by deception are the predicate acts of its RICO claim. 
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